Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Michael Laver, Kenneth A. Shepsle
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The authors formulate a theoretical model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them. The theory involves strategic interaction, derives consequences, formulates empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and tests the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experience with parliamentary democracy.
Categorias:
Ano:
1996
Edição:
1St Edition
Editora:
Cambridge University Press
Idioma:
english
Páginas:
320
ISBN 10:
0511625677
ISBN 13:
9780521438360
Série:
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Arquivo:
PDF, 6.07 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 1996